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Forrest P. General Facts, Physical Necessity, and the Metaphysics of Time. 2006.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://e-publications.une.edu.au/1959.11/501
General Facts, Physical Necessity, and the Metaphysics of Time
In this chapter I assume that we accept, perhaps reluctantly, general facts, that is states of affairs corresponding to universal generalizations. I then argue that, without any addition, this ontology provides us with physical necessities, and moreover with various grades of physical necessity, including the strongest grade, which I call absolute physical necessity. In addition there are consequences for our understanding of time. For this account, which I call the Mortmain Theory, provides a defence of No Futurism against an otherwise serious objection due to David Armstrong. In addition the Mortmain theory enables me to argue against the "Parmenidean" or Block Universe position that future and past are both real.